

One Simple Reason Why for Many Attitudes We
Will Never Have a Satisfactory General Metric

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Von Rang und Namen

Philosophical Essays in Honour of
Wolfgang Spohn

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INHALT

Vorwort	vii
Preface	ix
<i>Ansgar Beckermann</i> Die Perspektive des Richters	1
<i>Wolfgang Benkewitz</i> Intentionale Einstellungen, Bedeutung und Modalitäten	15
<i>Bernd Buldt</i> On Fixed Points, Diagonalization, and Self-Reference	47
<i>Ralf Busse</i> The Myth of the Given, the Problem of Induction, and Reference to Objects	65
<i>Christoph Fehige</i> One Simple Reason Why for Many Attitudes We Will Never Have a Satisfactory General Metric	95
<i>Wolfgang Freitag and Alexandra Zinke</i> Ranks for the Riddle? – Spohn Conditionalization and Goodman’s Paradox	107
<i>Gordian Haas</i> Epistemic Accessibility as a New Criterion of Significance	127
<i>Volker Halbach</i> Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Definition von Wissen, die als Lösung des Gettierproblems wird auftreten können	147
<i>Franz Huber</i> Means–End Philosophy	173

<i>Andreas Kemmerling</i> Repräsentationale Zustände	199
<i>Manfred Kupffer</i> Two Theories of Supposition	221
<i>Hannes Leitgeb</i> A Bridge Principle for Ranking Functions and Subjective Probability	243
<i>Godehard Link</i> Humean Delusions	255
<i>Arthur Merin</i> Bedeutung und die Grenzen der Absichtlichkeit – Über Hutcheson, Goethe, Darwin, H. P. Grice und »Oops!«	285
<i>Thomas Müller</i> Sleeping Beauty in Branching Time	307
<i>Julian Nida-Rümelin</i> Rationale Kooperation: die strukturelle Interpretation	327
<i>Martine Nida-Rümelin</i> Active Animals and Human Freedom	339
<i>Hans Rott</i> »If Oswald had not killed Kennedy« – Spohn on Counterfactuals	379
<i>Holger Sturm</i> Auf der Suche nach einer natürlichen Theorie der Eigenschaften	401
<i>Thomas Ede Zimmermann</i> Painting and Opacity	425
Zu den Autorinnen und Autoren	453

VORWORT

Vorliegender Sammelband vereint zwanzig neue philosophische Essays zu Ehren Wolfgang Spohns.

Wolfgang Spohn ist einer der großen analytischen Philosophen unserer Zeit, mit substanziellen Beiträgen zu fast allen zentralen Themen der Theoretischen und sogar einigen der Praktischen Philosophie. Den gemeinsamen Hintergrund für viele seiner Überlegungen bildet dabei die Theorie der Rangfunktionen, die Wolfgang Spohn seit 1988 in zahlreichen Aufsätzen und schließlich in seinem Opus magnum *The Laws of Belief* (OUP 2012) entwickelt hat. Angesichts der Rolle der Rangtheorie für sein Schaffen ergab sich die Wahl des Buchtitels beinahe von selbst.

Ehrungen erhielt Wolfgang Spohn zuhauf und zu Recht. Um nur die jüngsten zu erwähnen: 2012 wurde er als bislang einziger nicht-anglo-amerikanischer Philosoph mit dem Lakatos Award ausgezeichnet, und 2015 erhielt er den Frege-Preis der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie. Doch um es in seinen eigenen Worten zu sagen: »Honours are not important. Philosophy is.« Wir haben deshalb Weggefährten, Freunde und Schüler um philosophische Essays gebeten. Die Rückmeldung war überwältigend, sodass der resultierende Band deutlich umfangreicher wurde als ursprünglich geplant.

Die Beiträge spiegeln die Bandbreite von Wolfgang Spohns Arbeiten wider: Sie behandeln Themen aus der Erkenntnistheorie (z.B. die Theorie der Rangfunktionen, Glaubensrevision, die Natur von Wissen und Überzeugungen), der Wissenschaftstheorie (z.B. Kausalität, Induktion, Naturgesetze), der Sprachphilosophie (z.B. Bedeutungstheorie, Semantik kontrafaktischer Aussagen) und der Philosophie des Geistes (z.B. Intentionalität, Willensfreiheit) ebenso wie Fragen der Ontologie, der Logik, der Theorie der praktischen Rationalität und der Metaphilosophie. Die einzelnen Arbeiten sind aber nicht immer einfach zu kategorisieren. Manche lassen sich nicht ohne Gewalt einem der genannten Themengebiete zuordnen, andere umspannen mehrere. Wir haben die Aufsätze deshalb nicht in thematische Gruppen eingeteilt. Zur Übersicht sind den Artikeln englische Zusammenfassungen vorangestellt. Dass der Band damit den Charakter des Jahresbandes einer philosophischen Zeitschrift annimmt,

erscheint einer Festschrift für den langjährigen Herausgeber der Zeitschrift *Erkenntnis* durchaus angemessen.

Dank gebührt allen am Projekt Beteiligten: Zuvorderst den Autorinnen und Autoren für ihre Beiträge und für die reibungslose Zusammenarbeit; Christopher von Bülow für das Lektorat, die Kommunikation mit den Autoren und die Druckvorlage in \LaTeX ; Maryia Ramanava für das Coverfoto; Michael Kienecker und Saskia Thiele vom mentis Verlag für die hervorragende Betreuung des Projekts. Dass es gerade auch angesichts der großen Anzahl an Beteiligten und Mitwissern gelungen ist, das Projekt bis zur Verlagsankündigung im März 2016 geheim zu halten und damit Wolfgang Spohn eine echte Geburtstagsüberraschung zu bereiten, hat uns, den Herausgebern, neben großer Genugtuung auch Zugang zu seinem Weinkeller verschafft.

Besonderen Dank schulden wir Wolfgang Spohn selbst – und nicht nur für den Wein. Wolfgang Spohn hat uns, die wir in unterschiedlichen Konstellationen und zu verschiedenen Zeiten seine Schüler und Mitarbeiter waren, durch seine Philosophie geprägt. Jedoch hatten wir immer den Eindruck, dass weniger die Vermittlung seiner Ideen im Vordergrund stand als die Entwicklung der unseren. Dass wir der Philosophie folgen konnten, wohin sie uns führt, hat uns nun zu diesem Band gebracht.

Lieber Wolfgang, wir freuen uns sehr, Dir diese Sammlung von philosophischen Essays überreichen zu können!

W.F., H.R., H.S., A.Z.

PREFACE

The present collection includes twenty original philosophical essays in honour of Wolfgang Spohn.

Wolfgang Spohn is one of the great analytic philosophers of our time. He has contributed to almost all central topics of theoretical philosophy, and to some of practical philosophy, too. The unifying background of much of his thinking is the theory of ranking functions that was developed by Spohn in numerous articles since 1988 and that culminated in his book *The Laws of Belief* (OUP 2012), a true *magnum opus*. The significance of ranking theory for his work has led us naturally to the German idiomatic phrase that serves as the title of this book, *Von Rang und Namen*.

Wolfgang Spohn has received many honours, and rightly so. To mention just the most recent ones: in 2012, he won the Lakatos Award in philosophy of science, as the only philosopher from outside the Anglo-Saxon world so far, and in 2015, he received the Frege Prize of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy. But, to put it in his own words: »Honours are not important. Philosophy is.« For this reason we have asked long-time companions, friends, and former students for philosophical essays. The response was overwhelming, and so the present book turned out to be much more voluminous than we had initially planned.

The contributions mirror the scope of Wolfgang Spohn's work. They address topics from epistemology (e.g., the theory of ranking functions, belief revision, and the nature of knowledge and belief), philosophy of science (e.g., causation, induction, and laws of nature), the philosophy of language (e.g., the theory of meaning and the semantics of counterfactuals), and the philosophy of mind (e.g., intentionality and free will), as well as problems of ontology, logic, the theory of practical rationality, and meta-philosophy. Some papers are difficult to categorize. Some cannot be naturally assigned to one of the sub-disciplines mentioned, others cover several ones. We have therefore refrained from dividing them up into thematic groups. Each of the papers, including the ones written in German, is preceded by an abstract in English. It seems only fitting for a *Festschrift* for the veteran editor-in-chief of *Erkenntnis* that this book now looks like a sequence of papers as collected in the yearly volume of a philosophical journal.

We are grateful to everyone who participated in this project: the authors for their contributions and the good co-operation; Christopher von Bülow for copy-editing the contributions and typesetting the manuscripts in \LaTeX ; Maryia Ramanava for the cover photograph; Michael Kienecker and Saskia Thiele of mentis Verlag for the excellent editorial advice. That we succeeded, despite the large number of contributors and confidants, in keeping this project a secret until its official announcement by the publisher, thus presenting a real birthday surprise to Wolfgang Spohn, has given us great pleasure – and access to his wine cellar.

We owe special thanks to Wolfgang Spohn, and not just for the wine. We have been his students and his collaborators at various times and in various constellations. But we have always thought that he prefers our developing our own thinking rather than picking up his ideas. He let us follow the paths of philosophy and see for ourselves where they would lead us. This is how the present volume has come into being.

Dear Wolfgang, we are happy to present this collection of philosophical essays to you!

W.F., H.R., H.S., A.Z.

Christoph Fehige

ONE SIMPLE REASON WHY FOR MANY
ATTITUDES WE WILL NEVER HAVE A
SATISFACTORY GENERAL METRIC

ABSTRACT

It would be convenient to be able to express in real numbers to what extent a person has a certain attitude. With respect to many attitudes, however, we will never be able to do so in a satisfactory and general manner, for there are more such possible extents than there are real numbers.

The following thoughts are dedicated to Wolfgang Spohn, one of the best philosophers of his generation and a person of exceptional kindness and generosity. I am grateful to him for many things, including some of considerable calibre. Here is a small contribution to one of the questions that loom large in philosophy and largest in his own work: How and to what extent can the mind, at least the rational mind, be treated by the methods of exact science, with laws and numbers?*

THE YEARNING FOR METRICS

Consider Mary's various desires: her desire for pleasure, say, or for books, chocolate, fame, or money. It would be convenient to be able to express in real numbers to what extent Mary desires all that. Given such numbers, friends of Mary's and friends of rational decision-making might find it

* Unbeknownst to him, a set-theoretical piece of advice from Wolfgang Spohn has found its way into this paper. The material was first presented at the conference »Varieties of Goodness: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives« (London, May 2015), organized by Christopher Shields; participants as well as Ulla Wessels made helpful comments, some of which have shaped this written version. The figures were drawn by Thomas Fehige. My thanks to everybody.

easier to come up with advice for Mary. Moral philosophers could proceed with their theories of welfare as desire fulfilment and with normative theories that presuppose the measurability of welfare thus understood. Psychologists could try to formulate quantitative laws connecting Mary's desires to each other, to other states of her mind, and to her behaviour.

The numbers would guarantee that various kinds of things we may want to say make sense. We could say that Mary desires fame much more than Rose does, or that Mary desires fame more than twice as much as she desires money. We could draw lines. Take benevolence, for instance, which is the desire that other people be happy or, synonymously for today's purpose, that they fare well. We could say that everybody who is benevolent to the extent -10 or less is evil; that parents, kindergartens, and child psychiatrists should try hard to make the children in their care turn out more benevolent than the average adult; that we want to kiss only people who are benevolent at least to the extent 10 ; or that everybody who is benevolent to the extent 20 or more deserves a medal.

THE CLAIM AGAINST METRICS

The claim of this paper is, roughly, that considerations about cardinalities put a check on the hope of measuring attitudes. The argument is fairly simple, but as far as I can see not yet on the record. It seems that those logicians, metaphysicians, and philosophers of mind who wonder about the number of possible worlds and its relation to attitudes have focused on other aspects and that those moral philosophers who wonder about infinity and value have paid little attention to attitudes.

The claim is, more precisely, that for many attitudes we will never have a satisfactory general metric. The claim will be explained, and the argument stated, for one attitude in particular: benevolence. The extrapolation to other attitudes will be straightforward.

What is a metric of benevolence, and what would it be for such a metric to be general and for such a general metric to be satisfactory? A *metric of benevolence* is a function that assigns to each of various triples of a person and a world and a point of time a real number, where the number is supposed to represent how benevolent the person is in the world at the time. In the remainder of this paper, talk of a person's benevolence will often be elliptical, with the rest of the triple (the world and the time) left unmentioned; in the same spirit, everything that will be said about two persons' benevolence also applies to the benevolence of one and the same person in two different worlds or at two different times. A metric of benevolence is *general* if and only if for every triple $\langle \text{person, world, time} \rangle$

the metric is defined, provided the person exists in the world at the time. Such a general metric is *satisfactory* only if it succeeds in capturing the extent of people's benevolence. In order to do so, the metric has to meet at least the following *Ordering Condition*:

It holds true of all persons that one person is assigned by the metric a larger number than another person if and only if she is more benevolent. (Add worlds and times as appropriate.)

The introduction of the Ordering Condition, which itself needs neither defense nor explanation, completes the clarifying of the negative claim about measuring attitudes that this paper aspires to establish, and the establishing can begin.

BENEVOLENCE AND SITUATIONAL PREFERENCES: SUPERVENIENCE AND DOMINANCE

The proof employs situational preferences and thus requires saying what those are. Let us call any set of possible worlds a *situation*. In other contexts of inquiry we may do better restricting our attention to (and thus perhaps defining situations to be) finite sets of worlds, but not in this. Let us call a person's preferences as to which of the worlds from a given situation comes about, her *situational preference* concerning that situation. Such preferences are not limited to situations that the preferrer encounters in her life in the sense that the set mirrors her causal possibilities as an agent or that she believes it does; she can have preferences concerning sets that she knows have nothing to do with her. Here are some examples of situational preferences, with the situations themselves (that is, the worlds on offer) specified in the »given that« clauses:

- Mary wants, *given that one of the worlds w_1 and w_2 comes about*, that it be w_2 .
- Mary wants, *given that one of the worlds w_1 , w_2 , and w_3 comes about*, that it be w_2 or w_3 , and she doesn't care which.
- Mary wants, *given that one of the worlds w_7 , w_{12} , and w_{15} comes about*, that it be w_{12} ; and that, if it won't be w_{12} , it be w_7 .

The attitude of benevolence that we are looking at supervenes on situational preferences. If one person's benevolence differs from that of another, then so do the situational preferences.




Figure 1: The decisive difference in Dominance.

Is there a notion of benevolence according to which benevolence does not exhibit the supervenience? I find such a notion hard to fathom. If a person is benevolent in that she wants somebody or everybody to be happy, shouldn't we be able to find a situation in relation to which that wanting tips the balance, so that concerning that situation the person prefers a world in which the desired state obtains to one in which it does not? And if she wants that state more strongly than her neighbour does (and is in that sense more benevolent than her neighbour), shouldn't we be able to find a situation in relation to which that difference in strength tips the balance, so that concerning that situation she prefers a world that the neighbour does not prefer?

If some parts of a person's benevolence made no difference, concerning any set of worlds, to the question which of the worlds the person favours, those parts would be, in a very significant sense, idle. Why anybody would bother with a notion of benevolence that lugs this kind of baggage is a mystery. We need not solve the mystery, because the claim of this paper is merely about many attitudes, not about all, thus leaving us free to concentrate on the lean ones. No matter whether there are interesting attitudes that have funny extra bits, we focus on an attitude that does not. We focus on a benevolence that supervenes on situational preferences.

In particular, the kind of benevolence we are focusing on satisfies the following principle, which is concerned with comparisons of benevolence and will go by the name of *Dominance*:

- If Mary and Rose have situational preferences concerning all situations and those preferences of theirs are the same, except concerning some situations that each have (see Figure 1) the following properties:
- the situation comprises exactly two worlds
 - neither Mary nor Rose are around in any of the two worlds

- the amount of welfare is larger in one world than in the other
- concerning the situation, Mary favours the world with more welfare, whereas Rose favours the other,

then Mary is more benevolent than Rose.

And that conditional holds true of every two people.

Dominance is fully in line with supervenience. Every situation concerning which a person prefers a world with more welfare for other people over a world with less welfare for other people rates her benevolence a plus. Roughly speaking, every such preference is one fibre of her benevolence, and the more such fibres exist, the more benevolent she is.

A more general principle of dominance could be formulated than the one given here, but for today's argument the limited one will do. It has the advantage of eschewing certain difficulties and controversies (for example, about the possibly special role that variations in the more or less benevolent person's own welfare play for her benevolence) that do not pertain to the matter at hand.

MANY POSSIBLE WORLDS, MANY SITUATIONS

Now we come to the crucial fact that there are quite a few possible worlds and situations. In particular, there are at least as many possible worlds in which Fritz alone exists and is unhappy as there are sets of real numbers.

Should that claim need support, then the following example can provide it. Space might be continuous, and physics might be so extraordinary that at every point in space some kind of event can take place and can fail to take place, regardless of what is going on at other points. Thus, if unhappy Fritz stands next to a cube – see Figure 2 on the following page – any subset of the points in the cube might be the set of active points (points, that is, at which the said kind of event takes place), and there are as many such subsets, and thus at least as many worlds with lonely Fritz standing next to a cube, as there are sets of real numbers.

Consider some more-than-continuum-size set U of such worlds, and call the worlds from that set the *unhappy worlds*. There is also at least one world in which Fritz alone exists and is happy. Consider some such world and call it the *happy world*. We now define the set Sit of situations that each contain precisely one of the unhappy worlds and the happy world. In other words, $Sit := \{ \{u, \text{the happy world}\} \mid u \in U \}$. Since U is larger than the continuum, so is Sit .




Figure 2: An unhappy world.

It follows from the axiom of choice that Sit is well ordered by some binary relation. Consider some such relation \prec . With \prec being connex and anti-reflexive and Sit having more than continuum many elements, the chain \prec has more than continuum many links. We will now define for every link in the chain the set of the links that precede it. For every $x \in Sit$, $A_x := \{s \in Sit \mid s \prec x\}$. Obviously, for all elements x and y of Sit , $A_x \subsetneq A_y$ if and only if $x \prec y$. The whole matter (the well-ordering \prec , the chain of A_x , A_y , and other such A -sets, and the subset relation between the A -sets) is illustrated in Figure 3.

THE NUMBER OF SITUATIONS AS A CHALLENGE FOR
A METRIC OF BENEVOLENCE:
THE ARGUMENT FROM CARDINALITIES
AND DOMINANCE

Looking at a person who has situational preferences concerning all situations and keeping those of her preferences constant that concern situations that are not in Sit , we can ask what her situational preferences concerning the situations from Sit could look like.

Consider, for all $x \in Sit$, the subsets A_x of Sit that have been defined in the previous section. It holds true of every $x \in Sit$ that a person might well favour ...

- ... concerning every situation from A_x , the happy world;
- ... concerning every situation from Sit that is not in A_x , the unhappy world.

That gives us, for any $x \in Sit$, a constellation of situational preferences concerning the situations from Sit . Call, for any $x \in Sit$, that constellation of preferences the A_x -constellation.

What happens when we move up the ladder \prec ? The A -sets themselves gather more and more situations, and thus – see the right-hand side of




Figure 3: *Sit*, well-ordered by \prec . Right of centre, exemplified by A_x and A_y , the long chain of subsets of *Sit*, with each subset a proper subset of the next; and further right, exemplified by the A_x - and the A_y -constellation, a corresponding series of situational preferences concerning the situations in *Sit*.

Figure 3 – the corresponding *A*-constellations gather more and more situations concerning which the happy world is favoured instead of the unhappy one. It follows from Dominance that, as we move up the ladder \prec , a person who has the corresponding constellations of situational preferences is more and more benevolent.

But the ladder \prec has more than continuum many rungs. Thus, there are more differences in how benevolent a person can be than there are real numbers. That fact and the Ordering Condition jointly entail that we will never have a satisfactory general metric of benevolence. *Q. e. d.*

VARIETIES OF THE ARGUMENT FROM
CARDINALITIES AND DOMINANCE,
FOR BENEVOLENCE AND
OTHER ATTITUDES

As promised, the argument about benevolence extrapolates. It can serve as a blueprint for arguments about many oretic attitudes: ambition, anglophilia, curiosity, greed – you name it. Say that we want to customize the argument

for greed. We could then construct the relevant set *Sit* – call it *Sit_g* – as follows. We put the preferrer herself next to the cube, where Fritz used to be, with 1,000 three-carat diamonds that she owns and with a colleague who is happy. That provides us with the more than continuum many worlds to feed the more than continuum many sets of two worlds that make up *Sit_g*. Each such set of two worlds contains a different one of the cube worlds plus one other world, in which the preferrer owns 1,001 three-carat diamonds and her colleague is sad. As before, each of the more than continuum many sets of two worlds is a situation, and we look at the preferrer's situational preferences concerning every one of those situations. Every such situational preference for the world with one more diamond but a sad colleague is a fibre of the preferrer's greed. Enter the greed versions of Dominance and the Ordering Condition, and we're there.

The transposition to greed also illustrates that the problem is not that of some particularly elusive desideratum, as the example of benevolence might suggest. To be sure, benevolence is home to the extra challenge that the thing that is desired (people's welfare) is hard to measure, but that is neither here nor there. Diamonds can be weighed and counted, and they do the job in the case of greed.

Another variation of the original argument from cardinalities and dominance is also worth mentioning. It is not just the desideratum we can vary, but also the kind of source of the large cardinalities within one and the same desideratum. In essence, the argument about benevolence was that benevolence has, so to speak, too many fibres or too many building blocks. Those fibres or building blocks were preferences concerning individual situations, and that gave us a »too many situations« argument. But we could also look for »too many building blocks« arguments in which the building blocks are preferences concerning other entities than situations. In the case of benevolence, for instance, they could be preferences concerning individual beneficiaries instead, and that would give us a »too many beneficiaries« argument. The starting point would be that there are more than continuum many possible individuals. Surely, for each such individual *x*, a person's benevolence towards *x* (her desire that *x* be happy) is one fibre of the person's benevolence. A person is, other things being equal, more benevolent with that fibre than without. However, there are more than continuum many such fibres. Therefore, the ladder to universal benevolence has more than continuum many rungs.

DIFFERENT NUMBERS AND RATIONALITY

Where do we go from here? One suggestion would be that it is misguided to identify measurement with measurement by real numbers and that other items, more numerous than the real numbers, could do the job. That suggestion takes us to the limits of this paper, which has no aspirations to refute that possibility. However, doubts seem warranted. Suffice it to say that several decades of by and large consequentialist writings on the measurement of infinite utility streams have shown us how difficult it is to tame infinity.

Could rationality come to our rescue? There is not much good that it can do in the case at hand. The proof won't vanish if we insist that only situational preferences that are rational (one by one as well as jointly) be employed. That will get us nowhere because it is hard to see why we would be justified in calling any of the *A*-constellations of preferences that played a role irrational. As David Hume almost put it:

'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. And 'tis not contrary to reason to prefer Fritz's happiness only in conjunction with some arrangements of physically active points in the cube next to Fritz.

An appeal to rationality won't succeed in throwing out the material that the argument employs.

FINITENESS AND REGULARITY

Infinity looks like a culprit, so maybe we should start probing there. If we do so, we should keep in mind that there are many places of the argument at which infinity is not doing any work. In particular, each of the situations the argument works with is *radically finite* in the following sense: it contains finitely many worlds, each of which is inhabited by finitely many people, each of whom may as well have a finite level of welfare (say, -5 for the unhappy Fritz, and 5 for the happy Fritz). The infinity lies only in the number of such situations.

If we thought it appropriate to eliminate that last infinity as well, to finitize across the board, there would be hope. Consider a finite set Σ of situations, each of which is radically finite. Now consider a group of




Figure 4: Mary's situational benevolence value concerning situation s .

preferrers who all have, perhaps due to the architecture of their brains, situational preferences concerning precisely the situations from that set Σ .

Here is a metric of benevolence just for those people. In a first step we define, for every preferrer x we are looking at and for every situation s from Σ , x 's situational benevolence value with respect to situation s , $SBV(x, s)$, and in a second step, using the $SBVs$, the extent of x 's benevolence:

$SBV(x, s) :=$ the arithmetical mean of the total welfare in each of x 's favourite worlds from s (this is illustrated in Figure 4)

the extent of x 's benevolence $:=$ the sum of x 's $SBVs$ concerning the situations in Σ

That, or something like it, might do, provided that Σ has certain features to begin with. Note, however, that even without constraints on Σ we have now left the realm of general metrics (defined for everybody) and entered the realm of special metrics (defined for few), and that this one is very special indeed. It is, furthermore, unhelpfully special in that no real-life application that might compensate us for the loss of generality is within sight. For who are those people who don't have a single preference concerning a situation involving worlds with infinitely many inhabitants? And where is a group of people in which not just does everybody have curious cognitive limitations, but everybody happens to have the same curious cognitive limitations?

There may be a temptation at this point to say that, even if people have the further situational preferences (the ones not processed by the SBV approach), we could leave those preferences out of the picture, taking the SBV approach all the same. If the SBV approach ›works‹, why not apply it to those people, too? However, that would be deeply inadequate, since it would leave *relevant* items – and potentially very relevant items – out of the picture. It would violate Dominance. Surely the person who

prefers, concerning some situation, a world in which everybody from some infinite population fares well to a world in which everybody from the same population fares badly is, other things being equal, more benevolent than the person with the reverse preference. It would be absurd to say that the difference doesn't make a difference.

Regularity is another glimmer of hope, not least because it might enable us to keep at least some infinity on board. Consider a group of preferrers who all have situational preferences concerning only situations that are radically finite, but possibly concerning infinitely many such situations. Suppose that

- (i) every preferrer i has a personal constant c_i such that for every situation concerning which she has a situational preference her situational benevolence value SBV comes as close to c_i as the situation permits (and is the value above c_i if the situation permits for two $SBVs$ that would be closest);

or alternatively that

- (ii) every preferrer i has a fixed rate of exchange, c_i , between the public good and her private good – which is to say that for every unit of public good she is willing to sacrifice up to c_i units of her own good, and that willingness, applying to every situation concerning which she has a situational preference, determines that preference.

In both cases, we may want to say that a person's c is the measure of her benevolence.

Again, that, or something like it, might do, but, again, we have generalized, moving into the domain of very special and unhelpfully special metrics. For the question remains who those people are supposed to be. All their situational preferences concern radically finite situations and exhibit the regularity of being governed by a constant in the required way. Do you know somebody like that? The conceptual downshifting may have bought us a special metric, but none that applies to life as we know it.

CONCLUSION

There is no satisfactory general measure of benevolence, not even of rational benevolence, because benevolence is composed of, or correlates with, too many items that each make a difference. Given the quantity of such items and differences, there are not enough real numbers to go round. The same applies to many other attitudes. Measuring the mind can be a parochial enterprise at best.

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